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Abstract The acquisition of bidirectional action–effect
associations plays a central role in the ability to intention-
ally control actions. Humans learn about actions not only
through active experience, but also through observing the
actions of others. In Experiment 1, we examined whether
action–effect associations can be acquired by observational
learning. To this end, participants observed how a model
repeatedly pressed two buttons during an observation
phase. Each of the buttonpresses led to a specific tone
(action effect). In a subsequent test phase, the tones served
as target stimuli to which the participants had to respond
with buttonpresses. Reaction times were shorter if the
stimulus–response mapping in the test phase was compatible
with the action–effect association in the observation phase.
Experiment 2 excluded the possibility that the impact of
perceived action effects on own actions was driven merely by
an association of spatial features with the particular tones.
Furthermore,wedemonstrated thatthe presenceof anagent is
necessary to acquire novel action–effect associations through
observation. Altogether, the study provides evidence for the
claim that bidirectional action–effect associations can be
acquiredbyobservationallearning.Ourfindingsarediscussed
in the context of the idea that the acquisition of action–effect
associations through observation is an important cognitive
mechanism subserving the human ability for social learning.
Keywords Action–effect association.Observational
learning.Action control.Ideomotor principle.Motor
resonance.Skill acquisition.Social cognition
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An influential account of action control has proposed that
actions are controlled through bidirectional action–effect
associations (Elsner & Hommel, 2001; Hommel, Müsseler,
Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2001; Kühn, Elsner, Prinz, & Brass,
2009; Kunde, Hoffmann, & Zellmann, 2002). According to
this ideomotor approach, actions are represented in terms of
their sensory consequences, and action knowledge is
acquired through the repeated experience of co-occurrences
of actions and their effects. The cognitive representations of
intentional actions are therefore characterized by the associ-
ations of motor codes with sensory codes. Since the intention
to elicit a particular sensory effect is assumed to activate
directly the motor program associated with this effect,
acquired action–effect associations can be used for the
control of actions (Hommel, 2009). Evidence for this notion
has been provided by Elsner and Hommel (2001). Partic-
ipants were required to press buttons as a response to a visual
stimulus and experienced the co-occurrence of their actions
with specific tones. Importantly, these tones were irrelevant
to the participants’ task. In a subsequent test phase,
participants were presented with both tones again and were
asked to press the buttons in response to the tones. The
authors reported that participants’ responses were faster
when the preceding tone had previously been the conse-
quence of this action (i.e., were perceived as an effect of the
action) and concluded that the perception of the tone
activated the corresponding motor program.
However, action knowledge is acquired not only
through active action experiences, but also through the
We thank Gunda Carina Echeverria for help with data acquisition and
Angela Khadar for proofreading the manuscript.
M. Paulus (*):W. van Dam:S. Hunnius:O. Lindemann:
H. Bekkering
Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition & Behaviour,
Radboud University Nijmegen,
P.O. Box 9104, 6500 HE Nijmegen, The Netherlands
e-mail: m.paulus@donders.ru.nl
Psychon Bull Rev (2011) 18:1022–1028
DOI 10.3758/s13423-011-0136-3observation ofother people’s actions (e.g.,Blandin,Lhuisset,
& Proteau, 1999; Brass & Heyes, 2005; Cross, Kraemer,
Hamilton, Kelley, & Grafton, 2009;J e a n n e r o d ,2001;s e e
also Bandura, 1977). One might, therefore, speculate that
information about other people’s actions and their outcomes
is used by observers to control their own actions. More
precisely, the claim that all actions are cognitively repre-
sented and selected in terms of their effects (e.g., Hommel et
al., 2001) and the findings that action knowledge can also be
acquired through mere observation lead, thus, to the
assumption that bidirectional action–effect associations can
also be acquired by observational learning. Importantly, to
employ observed action–effect contingencies for our own-
action control, we need to relate our own motor codes to the
cognitive representation of the observed effect of another
person’s action. Previous research has shown that the mere
perception of someone else’s action facilitates the execution
of the same by the observer (Brass, Bekkering, Wohlschläger,
&P r i n z ,2000; Fadiga, Fogassi, Pavesi, & Rizzolatti, 1995;
Prinz, 1997). That is, considering this automatic motor
activation during observation, we hypothesize that motor
codes associated with an observed action and sensory
representations of the observed action outcome become
simultaneously activated and a new bidirectional action–
effect association can be acquired (cf. Elsner & Hommel,
2001).
In contrast to this consideration, however, it might be
possible that motor and sensory codes do not become
associated while others’ actions are observed. This alterna-
tive hypothesis recently received support by findings
suggesting that action–effect binding occurs only when
people intend to elicit an effect with their action (Herwig,
Prinz, & Waszak, 2007). More precisely speaking, Herwig
and colleagues showed that participants acquired an action–
effect association only when their action was determined by
their own choice, but not when the actions were triggered
by external stimulus events. Importantly, when observing
another person’s action, people do not intend to execute this
action and merely perceive it as triggered by someone else.
Following this argumentation, one would expect that no
action–effect binding will occur in such a situation.
Taken together, the aim of the present study was to
integrate the ideas of observational learning and ideomotor
action control and to examine whether the observation of
another person’s actions and their effects results in an
incidental learning of action–effect associations that mod-
ulates subsequent action execution (see Elsner & Hommel,
2001). In an action observation phase, the participants
observed another actor pressing two buttons that triggered
two different auditory effects. In a subsequent test phase,
the same tones were presented as stimuli to which the
participants had to react as quickly as possible with
buttonpresses. A finding of faster responses in the test
phase for stimulus–response (S–R) mappings that are
compatible with the action–effect mappings in the obser-
vation phase (as compared with incompatible mappings)
would provide evidence for the notion that participants
acquire action–effect associations via the observation of
others’ actions (i.e., social learning; Bandura, 1977).
Experiment 1
Method
Participants
A total of 24 students at Radboud University Nijmegen (18—
31 years; 6 of them male) participated in the experiment in
return for €8o rc o u r s ec r e d i t s .
Setup and stimuli
Participants were seated opposite to the experimenter. An
LED device was used to present the visual stimuli in the
observation phase. The device was positioned in the middle
of a table and contained two displays (77 × 18 mm), one
facing the participant and the other facing the experimenter
(viewing distance of approximately 75 cm; see Fig. 1). The
participant had no view of the experimenter's display. Visual
stimuli consisted of left- and right-pointing arrowheads. At
the left- and right-hand sides of the device were two buzzer
buttons (diameter, 5 cm; 3.5 cm high), which were
positioned close to the experimenter’s side of the table.
One of the buttons was red, the other one black. Auditory
stimuli were 400- and 800-Hz tones, presented for 200 ms
Fig. 1 Schematic overview of the experimental setup showing the
actor (bottom) and the observer (top)
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Procedure and design
Observation phase On the displays of the LED device,
arrowheads were presented at the beginning of each trial.
The experimenter performed left and right buttonpress
responses as instructed via the arrowheads on his display.
Each button triggered one of the two different sound
effects. On about 20% of the trials (randomly distributed),
the arrowheads on the two sides of the LED device pointed
in two different directions.
Participants were informed that the tones were
irrelevant to the task (see Elsner & Hommel, 2001)a n d
were instructed to closely observe the experimenter’s
actions and count the number of mistakes. An incorrect
response occurred if the experimenter performed a button-
press on the side that had not been indicated by the
arrowhead on the participants’ display. Importantly, inde-
pendently of the correctness of the responses, the button-
presses were always coupled with the same tones.
Participants were provided with a pen and a sheet of
paper. Every time they registered a mistake, they had to
cross out one of a row of circles on the sheet.
Each observation trial started with a fixation cross for
500 ms. After an interstimulus interval of 1,000 ms, an
arrowhead was presented. It remained visible until the
experimenter pressed one of the two buttons. The
corresponding tone was presented 50 ms after the experi-
menter’s response. The next trial started after an intertrial
interval of 1,500 ms.
The observation phase comprised 300 trials composed of
the factorial combination of two pointing directions of the
arrowheads and the accuracy of the experimenter’s perfor-
mance (i.e., 80% correct trials, 20% “mistakes”). Trials
were presented in a randomized order. The action–effect
mapping was counterbalanced across participants. For half
of the participants, the right buttonpress elicited a high tone
and the left buttonpress a low tone (mapping A), whereas
the action–effect mapping was reversed for the other half of
the participants (mapping B).
Test phase The procedure for the test phase followed
exactly that in Elsner and Hommel (2001). The buttons
were positioned in front of the participant, before the
experimenter left the room. Participants were asked to
discriminate between the presented tones and to react as
quickly and correctly as possible by pressing one of the two
buttons. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two
S–R mapping conditions. In the compatible S–R condition,
the S–R-mapping was the same mapping between response
and tone as the participants had experienced in the
observation phase. In the incompatible condition, the
relation was reversed, and participants had to respond to
the tone with the buttonpress that was opposite to the one
associated with the tone in the observation phase.
Responses had to be given within 2,000 ms. The intertrial
interval was 1,500 ms.
The test phase consisted of 100 randomly ordered trials
(50 high and 50 low tones). Half of the participants in each
condition had experienced action–effect mapping A in the
observation phase, and the other half had experienced
action–effect mapping B.
Results
Reaction times (RTs) were measured relative to the onset of
the tones (see Fig. 2 for means). Trials with incorrect
responses, no responses, and RTs deviating more than two
standard deviations of the mean RT were excluded from the
subsequent analyses. The 100 trials were divided into three
blocks consisting of either 33 or 34 trials each. Mean RTs
were calculated and submitted to an analysis of variance
(ANOVA) with the between-subjects factor of compatibility
(compatible, incompatible) and the within-subjects factor of
block (1, 2, 3). The RT analysis revealed a main effect of
compatibility, F(1, 22) = 7.86, p = .01, ηp
2 = .26, showing
that the response latencies in the compatible group (371 ms)
were significantly shorter than the latencies in the incom-
patible group (427 ms). There were no other significant
effects (all ps > .25).
Discussion
Responses in the test phase of Experiment 1 were faster for
S–R mappings compatible with the action–effect mapping
of another person’s actions (i.e., in an observation phase),
as compared with the incompatible S–R mappings. This
Fig. 2 Mean reaction times in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2. Dark
bars represent reaction times in the compatible condition, light bars in
the incompatible condition. Error bars indicate the standard errors
1024 Psychon Bull Rev (2011) 18:1022–1028suggests that participants had acquired action–effect asso-
ciations by observational learning.
What are the underlying cognitive mechanisms? Previ-
ous research has provided evidence for motor activation
when participants merely observe the action of another
person. In particular, it has been suggested that when
performing an action (e.g., a hand movement), people
associate the visual effect of this action (e.g., the moving
hand) with the activated motor code (Catmur, Walsh, &
Heyes, 2007; Heyes, 2010). When they subsequently
perceive the hand movement of another person, the
associated motor code will become activated, and the
action will thus be “mirrored.” We suggest that in our
experiment, the perception of the other’s buttonpress (i.e.,
hand action) led to an activation of the corresponding motor
code in the observer’s own motor system. When the
observer concurrently perceived the auditory effect of the
hand action, the representation of the effect (i.e., effect
code) became associated with the activated motor code by
means of Hebbian learning (see Hommel et al., 2001;
Keysers & Perrett, 2004). The presentation of the tone in
the subsequent test phase led then to an activation of the
associated motor code and, thus, to facilitation of the
respected action in the compatible condition (see Elsner &
Hommel, 2001).
Experiment 2
The aim of Experiment 2 was two-fold. First, it was designed
to examine whether the observation of a real action is
necessary to acquire novel action–effect contingencies or
whether the mere belief that an observed effect was caused by
another person’s action would be sufficient (see Sebanz,
Knoblich, & Prinz, 2005). To investigate this question,
participants in Experiment 2 experienced the co-
occurrences of a visual stimulus presented on the right or
left side followed by one of two auditory events (i.e., a low
or a high tone). By means of a cover story, participants were
led to believe that the yellow circles on the left and right sides
of the screen indicated another human agent’sl e f to rr i g h t
buttonpresses (action belief condition; see the Procedure
section of Experiment 2). On the basis of findings that action
observation and action imagination share common features
(e.g., Jeannerod, 2001; Munzert, Lorey, & Zentgraf, 2009),
one would expect the same effects as in Experiment 1.
The second aim of the experiment was to control for a
possible alternative explanation of the findings in
Experiment 1. That is, it cannot be excluded at this point.
that the faster response execution in the compatible
condition in Experiment 1 w a sd r i v e nb yl e a r n e da s s o c i -
ations between two perceptual features—that is, a spatial
event feature (e.g., left) with a particular tone (e.g., low
tone). When this tone was presented again in the test
phase, participants might have reacted faster with the
corresponding buttonpress because the perception of this
specific tone primed actions on the side that had been
associated with it. That would mean that participants’
facilitated response execution was the result of a
previously acquired association of visuospatial feature
codes with different sounds (i.e., perceptual associations),
rather than being due to the acquisition of action–effect
associations.
Consequently, half of the participants in Experiment 2
followed the same protocol as the participants in the action
belief condition, with the only difference that no cover story
was presented to them (nonaction belief condition). That
means that the participants experienced the co-occurrences
of the visual stimuli (i.e., yellow circles) and the auditory
stimuli (i.e., tones) without linking these events to an
action. If the effect of Experiment 1 w a sd r i v e no n l yb ya n
association of visuospatial feature codes with different
sounds, the nonaction belief condition should result in the
same pattern of effects (i.e., a facilitation in the compatible
condition). If, however, the effect of Experiment 1 was due
to the acquisition of action–effect associations, no facilita-
tion effects would be expected in this condition.
Method
Participants
A total of 48 students at Radboud University Nijmegen
(18–33 years; 12 of them male) participated in the
experiment in return for €8 or course credits.
Setup and stimuli
Participants were seated in front of a computer screen with
no other person present in the room. On the screen, white
left- or right-pointing arrowheads were displayed centrally
on a black background. Additionally, yellow circles
appeared as targets on either the right or the left side of
the screen. Motor responses and auditory effects were the
same as in Experiment 1.
Procedure and design
Observation phase The procedure was similar to that in
Experiment 1. Instead of a human model pressing the right
or left button, participants in both conditions of Experiment 2
(action belief and nonaction belief)v i e w e dl e f to rr i g h t
target circles preceded by arrowheads. The interstimulus-
interval varied randomly between 250 and 1,250 ms
(matching the confederate’s performance in Experiment 1).
Each appearance of a circle was followed by a tone. Similar
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mismatches between arrow direction and target position
(20% of the trials).
Importantly, the participants in the action belief
condition were scheduled in pairs. When they arrived at
the lab, they were told that they were going to perform a
task together on two different computers. Each of them
was brought into a separate room and subsequently
instructed like the first half of the participants, with the
important difference that they were told that the two
circles were caused by a buttonpress of the other person.
Before the observation phase started, the experimenter
demonstrated that the circles could be caused by a
buttonpress (e.g., pressing the right button caused a
circle to appear on the right side of the screen). Then
they were told that in the first phase of the experiment,
their partner would perform an RT task—namely,
pressing buttons as a reaction to the arrowheads on the
screen. It was mentioned that their screen was an exact
copy of their partner’s screen, so that they were able to
see the arrowheads as well as their partner’s reactions to
them as indicated by the circle positions.
Test phase The test phase was identical to that in
Experiment 1.
Results
Mean RTs were calculated and submitted to an ANOVAwith
the between-subjects factors of compatibility (compatible,
incompatible) and instruction (action belief, non-action
belief) and the within-subjects factor of block (1, 2, 3).
The analysis revealed a main effect of block, F(2, 43) = 7.76,
p <. 0 1 ,ηp
2 = .27, but no main effect of compatibility, F <1 ,
or instruction, F(1, 44) = 2.47, p =. 1 2 ,ηp
2 =. 0 5 ,a n dn o
interaction effect between compatibility and instruction, F <1
(see Fig. 1). As post hoc t-tests revealed, response latencies in
the first block were significantly longer (390 ms) than
latencies in the second block (369 ms) and the third block
(371 ms), t(47) = 3.94, p < .001, and t(47) = 3.07, p < .01,
respectively. This indicates that participants became faster
over time, suggesting a practice effect.
To investigate whether the null effect in Experiment 2
was due to a lack of power, we performed a post hoc
power analysis. Given the conventional level of statistical
significance of α = .05 and a sample size of 48 participants, a
posthocpoweranalysisrevealedanexcellentstatisticalpower
of (1-β) = .98 for the detection of a compatibility main effect
of η
2 = .23 (i.e., he same size as the effect observed in
Experiment 1). This suggests that the power of Experiment 2
was large enough to detect possible differences between the
conditions.
Discussion
The results of Experiment 2 show that participants did not
react faster in the compatible than in the incompatible
condition—either in the nonaction belief condition or in the
action belief condition. This suggests that no bidirectional
action–effect-association was acquired.
The aim of Experiment 2 was to examine whether the
acquisition of an association between tones and the spatial
perceptual features of left and right would affect subsequent
responses to buttons on the left and right sides of the
participant when responses were produced due to signaling
by the tones (non-action belief condition). The fact that
participants did not react faster in the compatible condition
allows the conclusion that a perceptual processing of
visuospatial features does not lead to a facilitated process-
ing of an event in the left or right action space. This
suggests that the participant’s faster reaction in the
compatible condition in Experiment 1 cannot have been
due to simple perceptual priming of a previously acquired
association between visuospatial feature and tone.
Experiment 2 tested, moreover, whether the mere
belief that these spatial perceptual features were the
consequences of another person’s actions allowed par-
ticipants to acquire action–effect associations through
observational learning (action belief condition). In this
condition, we could not find evidence that participants
acquired a novel action–effect association. There are
three possible explanations for this finding. First, one
could argue that a pure imagination of a goal-directed
action does not lead to an action representation that is
comparable to the observation of a goal-directed action
(see also Caettano, Caruana, Jezzini, & Rizzolatti, 2009),
even though they share many features (e.g., Jeannerod,
2001). Second, it was assumed that the verbal description of
the other person performing an action would lead to an
activation of the respective motor code (see Paulus,
Lindemann, & Bekkering, 2009). However,participantswere
not directly asked to imagine the other’s action. Different
resultsmighthavebeenobtainedinthelattercase.Third,since
we used yellow circles to indicate the action of the other
person, it is possible that the participants learned the circles as
effects of the other’s action, and not the tones (see Ziessler,
Nattkemper, & Frensch, 2004). Future research is thus
necessary to examine whether action–effect associations
can be acquired by the mere belief that another person has
performed an action.
General discussion
The present study shows that bidirectional action–effect
associations can also be acquired through the observation of
1026 Psychon Bull Rev (2011) 18:1022–1028other people’s actions and their effects and, thereby, extends
the ideomotor approach to the realm of observational
learning. These findings have implications for notions
regarding the acquisition of S–R mappings and for social
learning theories.
Recent research has shown that an acquired action–effect
mapping affects participants’ subsequent performance on an
S–R task when the previous effect of an action serves as the
stimulus to which participants have to respond with the
same action (Elsner & Hommel, 2001; Kunde et al., 2002).
Our study adds to these results the finding that observed
actions performed by others and their effects also affect
subsequent S–R tasks. Importantly, these effects were
present only when the associations were experienced in an
action context, but not when participants merely believed
that an outcome was caused by another person’s action. Our
results thus extend recent theoretical approaches to percep-
tion–action coupling (Heyes, 2010; Hommel et al., 2001;
Keysers & Perrett, 2004) and provide the first empirical
evidence that people can acquire bidirectional associations
between actions and distal effects through observing others’
actions.
Interestingly, it has recently been suggested that action–
effect associations will be acquired only if someone intends
to produce an effect by his or her action (Herwig et al.,
2007). Our finding of observation-based action–effect
learning is not necessarily in contrast to these findings. It
shows that the processes involved in the observation of
another person’s action share crucial features with processes
involved in the planning and execution of intentional action
(e.g., Jeannerod, 2001). Future research is necessary to
investigate in greater detail which features are necessary for
action–effect binding to occur.
Our finding, moreover, has implications for theories of
social learning (Bandura, 1977; Miller & Dollard, 1941),
since it suggests a cognitive mechanism that enables
humans to learn through the observation of others’ actions.
Whereas it has been established that humans learn through
the observation of others’ actions (Cross et al., 2009;
Torriero, Oliveri, Koch, Caltagirone, & Petrosini, 2007),
enabling them to avoid costly learning by trial and error, the
cognitive basis behind this ability has remained a topic of
intense discussion (e.g., Brass & Heyes, 2005). The present
findings provide evidence that the acquisition of bidirectional
action–effect associations might be a crucial mechanism that
allows humanstoacquirenovel action knowledge through the
observation of others’ actions (Paulus, Hunnius, Vissers, &
Bekkering, 2011).
In particular, we suggest that the perception of an action
leads to the activation of the same motor code in the
observer’s own motor repertoire. When the effect of this
action is perceived concurrently with the action, the
representation of the effect (perceptual code) will be
associated with the activated motor code, leading to the
acquisition of a novel action–effect association (see Elsner
& Hommel, 2001). When, on a later occasion, the same
effect is perceived or intended and the perceptual code is
thus activated, the associated motor code will also be
activated, leading to or facilitating the execution of the
action (Hommel et al., 2001). We propose that the
acquisition of bidirectional action–effect associations
through observational means might play an important role
in the uniquely human ability for social learning and
imitation of different behaviors, such as aggressive
behavioral tendencies in children (Bandura, Ross, & Ross,
1961) or the acquisition of novel action knowledge as
already seen in infancy (Elsner & Aschersleben, 2003;
Paulus et al., 2011). Future research is needed to examine
the scope and limitations of this cognitive mechanism, as
well as possibly differences betweenobservationallyacquired
action–effect associations and the ones that are acquired
through active action experiences.
In sum, the present study demonstrates an influence of
observed action–effect contingencies on own-action execution.
Our results suggest that bidirectional action–effect associations
can be acquired via observation and that this cognitive
mechanismmightunderliethehumanabilityforsociallearning.
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